

REASON.—In man, as already remarked, instinctive machinery for the regulation of outward conduct has become obsolete. In exchange he is equipped with Reason far more generously than any other animal. In attempting to define this faculty we enter upon ground which is strewn with the fragments of psychological discussion. It may perhaps be described as a process by which we weave our impressions and recollections into a connected tissue, instead of leaving them as a tangled mass of random happenings. To this end we are, in the first place, impelled to link together different impressions by their similarity of appearance, or by their contiguity in space, or in time—that is to say, we associate impressions that resemble one another, are related in space to one another, and precede or follow one another. We connect in this way one dog with another dog, a dog with its kennel, and a dog with a bite. In the next place we are impelled to infer that likeness in appearance implies likeness in what precedes, accompanies, or follows. I have been pricked by a bramble; I infer that if I touch that bramble, or another similar bramble, I shall be pricked again. I have, then, learnt to avoid what an insect would have avoided instinctively. But with my reasoning powers at this stage I have to learn a separate lesson for each particular set of objects. My learning gains in scope immensely when my reasoning powers are

completed by an
impulse to distinguish things *by their*
properties.
instead of accepting them as
indivisible wholes.
and to see in these properties the
causes of hap-
penings. I observe that the bramble
has the
property of thorniness. and. by
attaching my
inference not to the plant, but to the
property, I

¶ To recognize for instance. a soporific property in
opium as the
cause of its inducing sleep.